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Executive Summary 
 
 Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose international security threats because of their 
potential to inflict harm upon humans, crops, livestock, health infrastructure, and economies. The 
following questions stimulated the research described in this report: What infrastructure is necessary 
to enable EID surveillance in developing countries? What are the cultural, political, and economic 
challenges that are faced? Are there generalizations that may be made to inform engagement with 
developing countries and support EID surveillance infrastructure? 
 Using the U.S. Naval Area Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2) as a common 
denominator, this report compares barriers to EID surveillance in Cambodia and in Indonesia and 
presents key factors—uncovered through extensive interviews—that constrain disease surveillance 
systems. 
 In Cambodia, the key factors that emerged were low salaries, poor staff and human 
resources management and the effect of patronage networks, a culture of donor dependence, 
contrasting priorities between the government and international donors, and the lack of 
compensation for animal culling. Cambodian authorities have resisted a compensation scheme 
thus far, with speculation suggesting that the reason for this is the government’s concern that the 
possibility for corruption among poultry-holders is too great a risk. The Cambodian military has also 
played a part. The government ceased a merit-based salary supplement scheme for civil servants 
(including laboratory employees funded by the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria) after the military is alleged to have demanded similar pay incentives which donors had no 
interest in funding.  
In Indonesia, the key issues emerging as barriers to effective surveillance include poor host-
donor relationships, including differing host-donor priorities and a misunderstanding of NAMRU-
2 by Indonesian Authorities; low salaries; a decline in the qualifications of personnel in the 
Ministry of Health; poor compensation for culling; and difficulties incentivizing local-level 
reporting in an era of decentralization. Conflict between external and host actors was given the 
greatest emphasis, with “viral sovereignty” the primary problem. The Indonesian government 
perceived unfair treatment when it was asked to pay millions of dollars for a vaccine developed from 
a sample it originally provided for diagnostic purposes to the U.S. government through NAMRU-2. 
A poor host-donor relationship is a major barrier in Indonesia, which exhibits greater political and 
financial autonomy than Cambodia and other less-developed countries. 
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 Ultimately these differences are symptomatic of Cambodia’s and Indonesia’s different levels of 
development and their roles within the international community. This context demonstrates the 
primary difference in existing barriers to surveillance between the countries. Thus, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that other developing countries face similar barriers along a continuum from one 
extreme (Cambodia, where a genocide resulted in the death of a quarter of the population) to 
another (Indonesia, where state-of-the-art-labs can be run by Indonesians educated in countries such 
as France and Australia with some donor funds). 
 Scientists are fully capable of fixing technical problems in surveillance systems, but non-
technical barriers have been more difficult to confront. Not surprisingly, the primary challenges 
impeding surveillance are observed on the human resources side of the equation.  
 When it comes to viral sovereignty, technology transfer has been proposed as a possible 
solution to enable resource-constrained countries to produce their own vaccines. Yet this is easier 
said than done; international development has tried for more than six decades to raise living 
standards with limited success. What is certain is that Indonesia’s human resources are already 
capable of  producing some vaccines given sufficient technology, while Cambodia will require a 
decade or more to develop such a capability. It is clear that in Cambodia, technology transfer is 
necessary but not sufficient. 
 Many of the key factors emerging from interviews with in-country practitioners are the direct 
result of the existing level of development and, as such, are perhaps beyond the scope of health and 
scientific agencies at this point. Nevertheless, greater understanding is a critical first step in 
mitigating negative outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Motivation1 
 Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) pose international security threats because of  their 
potential to inflict harm upon humans, crops, livestock, health infrastructure, and economies. 
Influenza virus A/H1N1’s impact on the Mexican economy in 2009, for example, has been 
estimated at almost one percent of  that country’s Gross Domestic Product.2 The current state of  
human disease surveillance is reactive; that is, researchers detect microbes after an outbreak has 
already occurred. Furthermore, countries vary greatly in their EID surveillance capabilities. Effective 
EID surveillance is particularly problematic in developing countries. In order to envision such 
surveillance on a global scale, a set of  fundamental questions must be answered. What infrastructure 
is necessary to enable EID surveillance in developing countries? What are the cultural, political, and 
economic challenges that would be faced? Are there generalizations that may be made to inform 
engagement with developing countries and support EID surveillance infrastructure? 
By using Cambodia and Indonesia as case studies, and analyzing the role of the U.S. Naval 
Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) in these countries, this report finds that the primary 
constraints to disease surveillance systems in these nation-states stem from the challenges they face 
in the following areas: lack of financial resources, absence of a professional civil service, prevalence 
of grand and petty corruption, and the existence of unsustainable or ineffective patronage networks.3 
The key to promoting sustainability is in building national ownership and capacity, and transferring 
technology that enables local actors to take charge of their own EID surveillance systems. According 
to a director of Laboratory Systems Development at a major American university with experience in 
                                                 
* Sophal Ear, an Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, teaches courses on post-conflict reconstruction and the political economy of Asia. The views expressed in 
this report are those of the author, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy or U.S. government. I thank my 
Research Assistants: Zachariah James Falconer-Stout (who single-handedly plowed through 200 pages of notes and 
content and analyzed it with tags), Jim Chhor, Serei Linda Tauch, Khamly Chuop, John La, and last but not least Ita 
Perwira and Syefri Luwis (who were my eyes, ears, scribes, and sometimes spokespersons in Jakarta). The help and 
guidance of Meg Flanagan, Paul Forster, Amalya Mangiri, Gina Samaan, Sandra Yolles, Hugo Yon, and Jim McLaughlin, 
but most of all 49 contacts in Cambodia and Indonesia who cannot be named here for confidentiality reasons, is 
gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveats apply; all remaining errors are my own. 
1 This motivation is drawn from “Anticipating the Species Jump: Surveillance for Emerging Viral Threats,” Research in 
Progress, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 4 December, 2008. 
2 As cited in Wenzel, Richard P. “What We Learned From H1N1’s First Year,” Op-Ed, The New York Times, 13 April, 
2010. 
3 Defined as “Power to confer favors, give support and protection, or to appoint to office or position. Providers of 
patronage (patrons) and receivers (clients) form a network through which access to various resources is obtained. It 
originates from unequal distribution of power and, since ancient times, is closely linked with corruption.” 
(http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/patronage.html Accessed 8 October 2011.)  
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overseas laboratory capacity building, creating labs and disease reporting systems for only select 
agents is problematic. A broader approach is needed, one that would strengthen surveillance and 
laboratory capacity, address local priorities, and ultimately make possible better surveillance for the 
agents of public health concern. However, this director also noted that it is often difficult to 
convince funders of the importance of addressing broader public health systems issues.4 
The case studies of Cambodia and Indonesia demonstrate that both the technical and human 
aspects of disease surveillance systems must be addressed. As such, awareness of local political, 
economic, and cultural issues is critical if policy-makers are to build more effective disease 
surveillance systems. 
 
Background and Context 
NAMRU-2 in Indonesia 
 In Asia, NAMRU-2 is dedicated to maintaining the “operational readiness of  deployed 
forces in the region against infectious diseases with mission abortive potential,” and it represents a 
tremendous U.S. asset for EID surveillance. The NAMRU-2 website describes its work in emerging 
diseases research as follows: 
  
This [support role] necessitates an active approach to disease surveillance, which results in early 
detection and assists in directing appropriate public health prevention and/or intervention. 
Researchers accomplish this mission throughout Southeast Asia by: 
o Systematic multi-size hospital based studies 
o Investigation of  outbreaks involving significant morbidity and mortality in the region 
o Pre- and post-deployment serological screening of  Navy populations traveling in areas of  
unique disease transmission and occurrence 
o Monitoring the emergence of  anti-microbial resistance for selected and significant disease 
agents in the region.5 
 
NAMRU’s origin dates to 1944, when it was housed at the Rockefeller Institute in New York 
City. A detachment arrived in Jakarta in 1970 after its previous facility in Dà Nang, Vietnam, was 
disestablished.6 NAMRU-2 was a common entity in both Cambodia and Indonesia at the time this 
study was undertaken (until NAMRU-2 Jakarta was vacated in mid-2010). The two countries are 
demographically and geographically quite different. They have pronounced differences in population 
(14 million in Cambodia versus 228 million in Indonesia in 2008) and land area (69,898 sq. mi. 
                                                 
4 E-mail to author on Tuesday, August 31, 2010 12:40:51 PM. 
5 http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/Pages/namru_2_edr.htm Accessed 20 January 2011. In previous years, the page 
referred to Indonesia specifically. 
6 http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/documents/Timeline.pdf Accessed 8 October 2011. 
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versus 735,355 sq. mi., respectively).  
Following a move in 1991 of  its command headquarters from Manila (due to political 
turmoil in the Philippines) to Jakarta, NAMRU-2 came to be located in 50,000 square feet of  
laboratory, with office and storage space in three buildings within the Indonesian Ministry of  
Health.7 The facilities were well equipped, and the animal facility was accredited by the Association 
for Assessment and Accreditation of  Laboratory Animal Care. During a U.S. Institute of  Medicine 
(IOM) visit in October 2000, NAMRU-2 was staffed with 23 U.S. military personnel (including 14 
scientists) and more than 100 non-Americans.8 Notably, the IOM visit report said that Indonesian 
decentralization9 would result in greater demand for training and support of  national, provincial, and 
local public health initiatives, but it also described “the absence of  a training officer to coordinate 
formal training programs [with the Indonesian medical community].” The report further noted that 
“no staff  are assigned responsibilities for communicating or disseminating surveillance information 
to other partners.”10 According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, “In 2006, 
NAMRU-2’s staff  in Jakarta numbered 175, of  whom 19 were American. Indonesian staff  included 
44 scientists holding Bachelor’s Degrees, 7 with Master’s Degrees, and 13 with Doctoral Degrees 
(MD, PhD, or DVM).”11 
At the time of  its closure, NAMRU-2 Jakarta housed local technical capacity for surveillance, 
having created an Early Warning Outbreak Recognition System (EWORS) in 1998, though it was 
inadequate once handed over to the host nation due to limited financial resources and capacity on 
the Indonesian government’s part. Celia Lowe, an Associate Professor of  Anthropology at the 
University of  Washington who specializes in Indonesia and who has studied the anthropology of  
biosecurity, writes: “At the start of  the Indonesian [H5N1 influenza] outbreak in 2003, Indonesia did 
not have a molecular biology laboratory capable of  identifying the composition of  biological 
                                                 
7 Details of NAMRU-2 Jakarta drawn from http://www.nhrc.navy.mil/geis/sites/namru2.htm (no longer operational, 
but PDF of page is available) and history from http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/documents/Timeline.pdf 
Accessed 8 October 2011. 
8 IOM (2001) Perspectives on the Department of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System: A Program 
Review (edited by Philip S. Brachman, Heather C. O’Maonaigh, and Richard N. Miller), Institute of Medicine, National 
Academies Press, p. 50. Available: https://download.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10203&page=R1 Accessed 8 
October 2011. 
9 Decentralization is defined as “the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers; specifically : the delegation of 
power from a central authority to regional and local authorities” (see Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/decentralization Accessed 8 October 2011.) 
10 IOM (2001: 51) 
11 CSIS (2011) “The Defense Department’s Enduring Contributions to Global Health: The Future of the U.S. Army and 
Navy Overseas Medical Research Laboratories (authored by Lt. Gen. James B. Peake, USA Ret., J. Stephen Morrison, 
Michele M. Ledgerwood, and Seth E. Gannon), Center for Strategic and International Studies, June, p. 21. Available: 
http://csis.org/publication/defense-departments-enduring-contributions-global-health Accessed 8 October 2011. 
 4 | P a g e  
 
samples suspected to be H5N1 influenza virus.” (Lowe, 2010: 154) In contrast, NAMRU-2 
“operated a regional ‘reference lab’ for influenza virus testing in Indonesia.”12 This meant that in 
2003, NAMRU-2 would have been a key player in situations in which H5N1 was suspected. Lowe, 
who studied the international response to the H5N1 outbreak in Indonesia, identified several other 
challenges that are also examined in her report. She writes: 
  
The international response [to H5N1], which began in mid-2005, has focused on animal surveillance, 
control and vaccination, human health system capacity building, and information and behavior 
change communications. The response is challenged by the size, geography and infrastructure of  
[Indonesia], an exuberant democracy and extensive decentralization. Other diseases, sectarian 
tensions and regular natural disasters overshadow the threat of  [H5N1] to human health and food 
security. Nevertheless, issues of  trust between science, government, business and civil society, and 
nationalism, are shown to be key, as are the varying constructions of  risk, public goods and 
governance associated with the international organizations driving the response, and the people 
affected by the disease.13 
 
In addition, “viral sovereignty” emerged as an issue in Indonesia in 2006. The country’s then 
Minister of  Health, Siti Fadilah Supari, argued that viruses are the sovereign property of  individual 
nations. According to an Institute of  Medicine report “Indonesia claimed ‘viral sovereignty’ over 
samples of  H5N1 collected within its borders” and “announced that it would not share them until 
the WHO and developed countries established an equitable means of  sharing the benefits (e.g., 
vaccine) that could derive from such viruses.”14 Supari has invoked the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity in arguing for Indonesia’s control of  genetic material within its borders. Dennis 
Normile, a Japan-based reporter for Science, presciently warned in 2008 that NAMRU-2 “may fall 
victim to Indonesia’s determination to develop its own research capabilities and take control of  its 
H5N1 viral samples.”15  
 
NAMRU-2 in Cambodia 
Cambodia’s relationship with NAMRU-2 began in 1998, when the U.S. Ambassador to 
Cambodia, Kenneth Quinn, and the Cambodian Minister of  Health, Hong Sun Huot, signed an 
                                                 
12 Lowe, Celia (2010) “Preparing Indonesia: H5N1 Influenza Through the Lens of Global Health”, Indonesia, 90, 
October, pp. 147-170. 
13 Forster, Paul (2009) The Political Economy of Avian Influenza in Indonesia, STEPS Working Paper 17, Brighton: 
STEPS (Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) Centre, abstract on back cover of report. 
Available: http://www.steps-centre.org/PDFs/Indonesia.pdf Accessed 8 October 2011. 
14 IOM (2010) “Infectious Disease Movement in a Borderless World: Workshop Summary”, Institute of Medicine, The 
National Academies Press, p. 181. 
15 Normile, Dennis (2005) “First Human Case in Cambodia Highlights Surveillance Shortcomings”, Science, Vol. 307, no. 
5712, p. 1027, 18 February. 
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agreement establishing the NAMRU-2 laboratory in Phnom Penh.16 Both parties envisioned an 
active partnership to study infectious diseases. To support the agreement, the Minister of  Health 
assigned a two-story, 2,670-square-foot building at the Cambodian National Institute of  Health. 
Currently, the building houses a diagnostic laboratory, epidemiology staff, and administrative office, 
employing Cambodian technicians in bacteriology, serology, parasitology, molecular biology, and 
accessioning sections. As of  June 2011, the detachment is staffed by a U.S. Navy Captain and a 
Lieutenant, five local foreign civilian employees, and over 85 contracted laboratory technicians and 
medical/field staff. According to Navy Med News Current, investigations include studies on malaria 
drug resistance, avian influenza transmission studies, and passive surveillance at nine district clinics 
for etiology of  febrile illnesses. The laboratory also engages with the Cambodian military for 
training of  medical staff. 
  Cambodia is a heavily aid-dependent country where half  of  the government’s budget is 
donor-financed.17 Not surprisingly, it has enjoyed smooth relations with its NAMRU-2 detachment 
to date. Just as Indonesia had done from the arrival of  NAMRU-2’s detachment in 1970, and the 
Command itself  in 1991, Cambodia allowed NAMRU-2 (and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control) 
to build an office complex inside Cambodia’s National Institute of  Public Health compound. As 
with Indonesia, NAMRU-2 has contributed to EID surveillance in Cambodia, assisting in the 
discovery of  the country’s eighth and ninth confirmed H5N1 cases. Both victims survived, unlike all 
seven previous cases and the subsequent eight (who were not discovered by NAMRU-2). As of  this 
writing, there have been 17 cases (seven since 2011). 
Nonetheless, animal surveillance has lagged in Cambodia (in part because the government 
culls poultry without compensation),18 as it has in Indonesia (where H5N1 in animals is endemic). In 
addition, just as in Indonesia, Cambodian politics plays an important role in science. I was told by 
knowledgeable sources that positive results have been suppressed when it comes to H5N1 detection 
in animals. This “outbreak declaration sovereignty”—in which the country exercises discretion in 
declaring (or more importantly, not declaring) an outbreak to the World Animal Health Organization 
(Office International des Epizooties or OIE)—is Cambodia’s version of  viral sovereignty. As with 
                                                 
16 Details of NAMRU-2 drawn from 
http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/documents/NMRD_News_Vol_I_Issue_2.pdf  
17 Foreign aid pledges for 2010 to Cambodia totaled nearly $1 billion in 2009, while the national budget for 2009 was 
$1.88 billion, including foreign financing. 
18 See Ear, Sophal and Sigfrido Burgos (2009) “Livelihoods and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Cambodia”, 
World’s Poultry Science Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 633-640, December and Ear, Sophal (2011) “The Political Economy of 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Cambodia”, International Journal of Poultry Science, 10 (1): 71-75. 
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all members of  the OIE, only the member government itself  has the authority to declare in-country 
animal outbreaks through its OIE Permanent Delegate (PD),19 and it protects its right to do so as a 
sovereign state.20 As shown in Table 1, Cambodia has shifted its OIE PD among three different 
positions in the bureaucracy of  the Ministry of  Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The 
elevation of  titles over time suggests that the importance of  being OIE PD has grown politically 
more powerful. (A Deputy Secretary General outranks a Director who in turn outranks a Deputy 
Director, and so on.) 
 
Table 1: Permanent Delegate of  Cambodia to the World Animal Health Organization 
Date Name Title 
4 May 2009 Dr X Deputy Secretary General, MAFF 
23 April 2007 Dr Y Director, Department of  Animal Health and Production, MAFF 
1 May 2004 Dr X Deputy Director, Department of  Animal Health and Production, MAFF 
7 February 2003 Dr Z Chief  of  National Animal Health and Production Investigation Center, MAFF
Source: http://www.oie.int/en/about-us/key-texts/official-acts/appointment-of-official-delegates/ Accessed 8 
October 2011. 
 
By contrast, as shown in Table 2, in Indonesia the OIE PD changes almost as regularly as in 
Cambodia, but the title remains the same: Director General, Livestock Services, Ministry of  
Agriculture (MoA). The author was informed during interviews in Indonesia that the country had 
not declared any H5N1 outbreaks to the OIE in recent years, despite the fact (or perhaps because) 
                                                 
19 As the OIE itself notes: “Whenever an important epidemiological event occurs in a Member, the Member must 
inform the OIE by sending an Immediate Notification (terrestrial and aquatic animals) which includes the reason for the 
notification, the name of the disease, the affected species, the geographical area affected, the control measures applied 
and any laboratory tests carried out or in progress. Diseases notifiable to the OIE used to be classified into two lists, List 
A and List B. In May 2004, OIE Members approved the creation of a single list of diseases notifiable to the OIE. 
Modifications to the List can be made annually, subject to the approval of the World Assembly of Delegates during its 
General Session. The modified List does not come into force until the following January, so as to ensure that the list of 
diseases remains the same for any given calendar year. Proposed changes to the List are based on a decision tree 
contained in an OIE international standard. A new list has been approved in May 2009 by the Assembly and came into 
force in 2010.” See http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-
system/the-oie-data-system/ Accessed 8 October 2011. 
20 It should be noted that in 2002, OIE began a program of non-official and rumor reporting for animal health and 
public health. However, OIE still requires verification of rumors collected from unofficial data in order to broaden 
syndromic surveillance (which includes media reports). As the OIE notes “One of the OIE's chief mandates is to ensure 
the transparency of the world animal health situation. To meet this objective, the OIE collects official notifications of 
animal diseases from its Members, including notifications involving zoonoses (animal diseases transmissible to humans) 
and disseminates this information to the international community … To this end, Members have authorised the OIE 
Headquarters to contact their national Delegate directly whenever health information is reported in the media or other 
non-official sources that could involve an event legally requiring immediate notification to the OIE).” See 
http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-system/the-oie-data-system/ 
Accessed 8 October 2011. 
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the disease is already endemic in poultry.21 
 
Table 2: Permanent Delegate of  Indonesia to the World Animal Health Organization 
Date Name Title 
21 November 2007 Dr A Director General, Livestock Services, MoA 
10 October 2005 Dr B Director General, Livestock Services, MoA 
22 July 2004 Dr C Director General, Livestock Services, MoA 
Source: http://www.oie.int/en/about-us/key-texts/official-acts/appointment-of-official-
delegates/ Accessed 8 October 2011. 
 
The complexities of  disease surveillance are noted in a 2009 paper by Louise Gresham of  
the Nuclear Threat Initiative and others: “The sensitive nature of  local political, economic, and 
social conditions existing within regions reinforces the notion that successful partnerships focus on 
mutual interests that will produce net benefits to all partners.”22 The authors go on to emphasize the 
inability of  a one-size-fits-all model to create the flexible networks necessary for effective disease 
surveillance. Potential mechanisms to achieve flexible networks include informal memorandums of  
understanding or more formal legal architectures detailing specific obligations.23 It is not only the 
governance arrangements of  disease surveillance networks themselves, but the governance of  
veterinary services where, according to Bernard Vallat, head of  OIE, “Appropriate prevention and 
control of  animal diseases depends first of  all upon policies of  good veterinary governance [that] 
must be underpinned by legislation inspired by OIE standards but they must also be backed up by 
the necessary resources for its enforcement, in particular by the Veterinary Services supported by 
their public and private sector components working together in a clearly defined partnership.”24 
Recognition by scholars and policy-makers of  explicitly political and economic challenges is 
apparent, but what of  cultural considerations in improving the effectiveness of  EID surveillance? 
                                                 
21 To understand the political economy of outbreak declaration in animals, examining the human health equivalent and 
the incentives/disincentives involved, is useful: “Since 1951 states have been required by the International Sanitary 
Regulations (renamed the International Health Regulations in 1969) to notify the WHO within 24 hours of cases of 
designated diseases (including, as of 1981, those on airplanes and ships) and to obtain laboratory diagnoses. States are 
also required to inform the WHO and travellers of measures they intend to enact and to submit weekly reports on the 
development of outbreaks. In practice, however, many states have not reported outbreaks, and when the WHO has 
announced such occurrences, it is often some time after the fact. This rather weak system, hardly the fault of the WHO 
secretariat or its committees, reflected the lack of concern about the transmission of diseases among industrial countries 
and an unwillingness to suffer the consequences of reporting among many developing countries.” (Zacher, 1999: 272) 
22 Gresham, L., Ramlawi, A., Briski, J. Richardson, M. and Taylor, T. “Trust Across Borders: Responding to 2009 H1N1 
Influenza in the Middle East,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 7, Number 4, 2009, 
p. 403. 
23 Ibid. 
24 http://www.oie.int/en/for-the-media/editorials/detail/article/veterinary-medicinal-products-and-vaccines-
indispensable-tools-for-any-effective-animal-health-and/ Accessed 8 October 2011. 
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Indonesia and Cambodia bear sufficient similarity to provide adequate grounds for 
comparison when addressing cultural considerations. At the same time, a significantly different set 
of  challenges to EID surveillance—driven primarily by the lack of  resources in Cambodia and 
greater independence in Indonesia—allow for variation on the dependent variable (namely, 
surveillance effectiveness), while providing important opportunities to glean new insights on barriers 
to effective EID surveillance. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The question of  the necessary, or ideal, infrastructure needed for effective disease surveillance has 
been discussed extensively in the context of  developing countries. A Government Accountability 
Office report published in 2001 notes: 
  
Surveillance systems in all countries suffer from a number of  common constraints. However, these 
constraints have their greatest impact in the poorest countries, where per capita expenditure on all 
aspects of  health care amounts to only about 3 percent of  expenditure in high-income countries. 
Surveillance in developing countries is often impaired by shortages of  human and material resources. 
Key positions in laboratories and clinics often are filled by people who do not possess the necessary 
qualifications. According to [the World Health Organization], staff  in over 90 percent of  developing 
country laboratories are not familiar with quality assurance principles, and more than 60 percent of  
laboratory equipment is outdated or not functioning… In addition, poor roads and communications 
make it difficult for health care workers to alert higher authorities about outbreaks or quickly 
transport specimens to laboratories … In addition, multiple surveillance systems are often poorly 
coordinated and not firmly linked to response measures. The absence of  a clear response discourages 
lower level officials from investing effort in surveillance, and this leads to many cases of  disease 
going unrecorded and unreported. These weaknesses limit the effectiveness of  even the most widely 
supported international disease control programs. They also impair routine surveillance for other 
diseases and efforts to investigate and respond to outbreaks, newly emerging diseases, and growth in 
antimicrobial resistance.25  
 
Aside from an explicit critique of  the technical (“equipment is outdated or not functioning”) and 
human resource constraints (“shortages of  human … resources”), this 74-page report hints at both 
economic (“shortages of  … material resources”) and political (“absence of  a clear response”) 
obstacles. However, the report never delves into an important political aspect—namely the lack of  
political will for surveillance due to competing incentives—nor does it touch upon cultural 
constraints that impair effective surveillance. While there is no known source for recent statistics on 
quality assurance and outdated or malfunctioning equipment in developing country laboratories, the 
                                                 
25 GAO (2001) Global Health: Challenges in Improving Infectious Disease Surveillance Systems, Report to Congressional 
Requesters, GAO-01-722, United States General Accounting Office, August, p. 3.  
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Director of  Laboratory Systems Development at a major American university with whom the 
GAO’s description was shared for insights wrote the following: “From my own [recent] experiences 
in countries (Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, India, Sub-Saharan Africa) I believe 
the status has not changed much from the date of  the report you cited [2001].”26 Indeed, there may 
even be disincentives to detecting emerging (and re-emerging) infectious diseases, especially when 
trade is at stake. Emeritus Professor of  Political Science at the University of  British Columbia Mark 
Zacher (1999) argues: “The impact of  the early surveillance was also limited because countries often 
did not report on disease outbreaks for fear of  losing commerce. This pattern has held over the 
course of  this century.”27 
As evidenced by Mexico’s experience with A/H1N1 in 2009, with nearly one percent loss of  
GDP,28 it is evident that a global fund is necessary to provide countries with the necessary assistance 
to ensure their own citizens’ health. Even prior to Mexico’s experience, the WHO and Nuclear 
Threat Initiative (NTI) proactively created an Emergency Outbreak Response Fund: 
  
                                                 
26 E-mail to author on Tuesday, August 31, 2010 11:28:40 AM. The director further added “The Division for which I 
was responsible … focused on quality assurance rather than on disease specific tests. Funding for any work related to 
strengthening laboratories generally comes from disease specific programs (e.g., HIV, Malaria, TB, etc.) so the laboratory 
work tends to focus on implementing tests with little consideration of the infrastructure that is required to assure quality 
practices. Disease specific programs didn’t (and for the most part, still don’t) see laboratory quality assurance and 
management as issues for expending their disease-specific resources. As you might imagine, this is a source of 
considerable frustration since the new direction for the Global Health Initiative is supposed to be focused on country 
ownership and sustainability. Without attention to issues of quality (including the ability of a country to procure quality 
test kits/reagents, access to proficiency testing, oversight of laboratories, etc.), sustainability will not be possible. With 
respect to diagnostic microbiology, the issues are even more complex. While many seem to think that technology will 
provide the answer through point-of-care assays, those are some distance off and despite supposed ‘ease of use’ those 
assays still require an understanding of appropriate quality assurance. In addition, many of the new molecular 
technologies are dependent on instrumentation that is expensive and dependent on a constant power supply which does 
not exist. Conventional microbiology also requires an understanding of quality assurance practices and the ability to 
procure quality materials. If donors are providing everything without paying attention to the shortcomings of the 
systems issues within the country, then the work will not be sustainable. Not a very direct response to your question and 
a bit long-winded, but those are the major issues I see that will hold back implementation of conventional or new 
technology. I am currently doing some work in Ethiopia, and there is virtually no diagnostic microbiology being 
performed in hospitals in Ethiopia. In India, where I have worked with World Bank and CDC Global AIDS Program, 
the situation is not much better. While some facilities perform microbiological procedures, there is no way to document 
quality of any of the work. As an example, I was in a district hospital where the laboratory director (a medical 
microbiologist) told me they had dehydrated blood agar. When I asked him about the source of blood, he said it was 
dehydrated. While I am sure someone in his lab knew that they needed to add sheep blood, this person who was 
supposed to be somewhat authoritative did not understand that there was no blood in the bottle of dehydrated medium 
he was showing me.” 
27 Zacher, Mark (1999) “Global Epidemiological Surveillance: International Cooperation to Monitor Infectious 
Diseases” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, eds. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 
Century. Available: http://www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/TheBook/thebook.html Accessed 8 October 2011. 
28 Wenzel, Richard P. “What We Learned From H1N1’s First Year,” The New York Times, 13 April 2010. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/opinion/13wenzel.html Accessed 8 October 2011. 
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[A] rapid outbreak response fund to strengthen the global response to infectious disease outbreaks, 
whether naturally occurring or from the release of biological weapons. The WHO-NTI Emergency 
Outbreak Response Fund will ensure that response teams can be on the ground within 24 hours of a 
detected outbreak – wherever it occurs around the globe.29 
 
This fund was formed in 2002 and was established with a renewable $500,000 grant for responses to 
outbreaks. This money was not for economic losses incurred from reporting outbreaks. It was a 
foundational sum designated by the WHO for immediate mobilization and response, while longer-
term funding was solicited from the member countries of the World Health Assembly. 
 
Gap Between Awareness and Practice 
Sociologist Hendri Restuadhi (2008) studied, from an anthropological perspective, Indonesia’s 
Participatory Disease Surveillance & Response program, carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
local government livestock services and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and 
supported primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Australian Agency for 
International Development, and the government of Japan.30  
 Unfortunately, as Restuadhi notes, his findings echo those of  medical anthropologist 
Benjamin Hickler (2007), 31 who examined the gap between H5N1 “awareness” and practice in 
Cambodia. The gap is between poor poultry-keeping practices and high awareness of  H5N1, 
because poultry holders cannot financially afford to follow recommended practices, especially in the 
presence of  Newcastle disease (an endemic poultry disease like H5N1, but which is harmless to 
humans). This conflict can even take place in a family that had a member die from H5N1 as shown 
in Hickler’s research; not even the loss of  a loved one is enough to alter an entire family’s habits. In 
Restuadhi’s determination, “it is thought that there is a gap between these three situations: the 
dissemination of  information on the AI outbreaks, the weak follow up to the outbreaks and the 
                                                 
29 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/pr92/en/ Accessed 8 October 2011. 
30 According to international development scholar Paul Forster (2009: 34), Participatory Disease Surveillance & 
Response “is based on a qualitative approach to epidemiology known as participatory epidemiology, which has the 
objective of developing and supporting a community-based response to detecting and preventing the disease by using 
local knowledge of where and when outbreaks are occurring, and enlisting the local population in control efforts. It has 
much in common with established techniques of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) but has evolved significantly in 
Indonesia. The first phase of the PDSR project emphasized the detection and control of HPAI by separate surveillance 
and response teams primarily in ‘backyard’ settings at the household level. Now, a broader village-level approach 
encompasses all poultry farmers, traders and community leaders; a greater stress is put on empowering communities to 
understand the origin, prevention and control of all poultry diseases; and better links are sought with veterinary services, 
where capacity is being developed through PDSR.” 
31 Hickler, Benjamin (2007) “Bridging the Gap Between HPAI “Awareness” and Practice in Cambodia: 
Recommendations from an Anthropological Participatory Assessment,” Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal 
Diseases, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. Available: 
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload//241483/ai301e00.pdf Accessed 8 October 2011. 
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chicken consumption pattern that remains unchanged. While the communication campaigns are very 
intense, the follow up of  outbreaks is inadequate and the eating habits stay the same.”32 In other 
words, old habits in the presence of  insufficient resources trump ad campaigns that, while 
understood, simply do not integrate well with commonly practiced food-handling techniques. In 
Cambodia, for example, farmers find the quarantining of  new poultry when introduced to existing 
flocks cost-prohibitive and poultry found dead are still perennially consumed. Prior to 2011, 
Cambodia had only 10 confirmed cases of  H5N1. Since 2011, seven new confirmed cases of  Avian 
Influenza have emerged in Cambodia, and all of  these have been fatal. 
 
Can Rumor Surveillance Help? Yes, but… 
Australian epidemiologist Gina Samaan et al. (2005) describe the enhanced rumor surveillance 
undertaken during the H5N1 outbreak in 2004, during which the World Health Organization’s 
Western Pacific Regional Office identified 40 outbreak rumors (seeking out and analyzing media 
reports, professional groups, the public, and persons in the WHO network) and verified nine to be 
true. They argue that rumor surveillance informed immediate public health action and prevented 
unnecessary and costly responses. Specifically, “Each rumor was followed up by an email or a 
telephone request to the relevant WHO country office to investigate its veracity. The WHO country 
office in turn sought verification from the country’s health authorities. Overall, the onus of  the 
verification process was in the hands of  the affected country’s health authorities [emphasis added]. The 
authorities had to demonstrate to WHO that appropriate investigations were conducted to deem 
rumors correct or incorrect. To ensure this process, WHO sometimes supported rumor verification 
by assisting in laboratory testing or shipment of  isolates.” Even with WHO’s assistance in laboratory 
testing or shipment of  isolates, the contrast between what the authorities in Cambodia are capable 
of  doing on their own, in particular laboratory testing, and what Indonesia can do, is significant. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Building on the insights of  the existing literature above, a qualitative comparative case study focusing 
on effective surveillance in Cambodia and Indonesia was undertaken. Nearly 50 interviewees were 
consulted in total during 2009 and 2010 following a semi-structured format, with Indonesian 
                                                 
32 Restuadhi, Hendri (2008) “Bird Flu: Chicken Consumption, Rearing Practices and Perception of Poultry Diseases”, 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, December, p. 31. 
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research emphasized because the author had undertaken numerous related interviews previously in 
Cambodia for other research.33 The Cambodia interviews took place in Phnom Penh over the course 
of  three visits in January, August, and December 2009 and were conducted in English and Khmer. 
The interviews in Indonesia took place over the course of  12 days in Jakarta during January 2010 
and were conducted in English and Bahasa Indonesia with the help of  two research assistants. More 
than 200 pages of  notes were collected and analyzed by way of  content analysis and tagging of  key 
concepts, which enabled frequency analysis to obtain a ranking of  top issues raised. Content analysis 
is used in the social sciences for studying the content of  communication by analyzing recorded 
transcripts of  interviews with participants. Harold Lasswell (1951: 525) formulated the core 
questions of  content analysis: “Who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what 
effect?”34 Ole Holsti (1969: 14) offers a broad definition of  content analysis as “any technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of  
messages.”35 
 The limitations of  drawing conclusions based on interviews are as follows: Interviews are 
labor-intensive, time-consuming, subject to bias, distortion, and lack of  validity and reliability. In 
addition, the author’s American citizenship could bias interviewees, and the author’s business card—
showing an affiliation with the Naval Postgraduate School—meant that for some officials, 
particularly in the Indonesian government, interviews could not be undertaken without prior 
authorization from a supervisor at the director level. In one case, an interview was aborted due to 
untimely authorization. In other instances, the author’s Cambodian origin caused Indonesian 
informants to believe that the author was not American, causing them to feel as if  they were 
speaking to someone from another—perhaps less—developed country. Having worked in 
international development for a number of  years for the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
and the United Nations Development Programme, the author was able to engender a rapport 
quickly with informants who might otherwise have perceived the author as an ivory tower academic. 
By comparing two different country cases with one common actor—NAMRU-2—
determinants of  success and failure were identified for a wider range of  developing country 
contexts.36 Indeed, as detailed earlier, the Cambodia-Indonesia comparison offers a great contrast. In 
                                                 
33 See Ear and Burgos (2009) and Ear (2011). 
34 Lasswell, Harold (1951). The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach. Routledge, London. 
35 Holsti, Ole (1969). Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley. 
36 Given that both Cambodia and Indonesia are in Asia, the addition of a case study on Egypt or Kenya in future 
research will strengthen the validity of findings. 
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Indonesia, issues of  trust between the government and international organizations have resulted in 
tense relations, while Cambodian officials are more than happy to have NAMRU-2 there because the 
country is so dependent on external help. Indeed, unless NAMRU-2 were to begin to undermine the 
political regime by destabilizing it or offending it, there is no foreseeable end to NAMRU-2’s 
presence in Cambodia in the coming decades.  
 
Hypotheses Devised in January-February 2009 
Originally hypothesized challenges (Table 3) included, for example, the lack of  financial and 
technical resources for Cambodia’s public health infrastructure (civil servants are paid as much as 
garment workers—$50 per month in Cambodia). This structure means that much of  what takes 
place is supported by donors and is of  dubious long-term sustainability. Political support for soft 
sectors such as education and public health is often eclipsed by more powerful ministries like 
defense in Cambodia, while in Indonesia viral sovereignty threatens the involvement of  external 
participants, such as NAMRU-2. Finally, on a cultural level, the use of  regional (non-Cambodian) 
technical staff  in management positions (because of  the lack of  indigenous expertise to staff  these 
positions) for Cambodia’s NAMRU-2 office can be a culturally challenging exercise because of  the 
country’s tensions with neighboring countries (such as Thailand) both historically and recently. Being 
sensitive to this context can increase the likelihood of  success in transferring technical skills. 
 
Table 3: Hypothesized Challenges to Effective EID Surveillance in Cambodia & Indonesia 
Devised in January/February 2009 
 Cambodia Indonesia 
(1) 
Economic 
Lack of  financial and technical 
resources set an already low bar for 
public health system. Existing heavy 
donor involvement unlikely to be 
sustainable. 
Lack of  financial and technical resources (though 
likely to a much lesser extent than Cambodia 
where half  the government’s budget is donor 
financed—while Indonesia is hardly dependent 
on foreign aid). 
(2) 
Political 
Lack of  political will in public health 
infrastructure and recurrent costs 
support; plenty of  willingness to 
spend in Defense sector. 
 
Resources politicized, patronage 
rampant; and privatization of  public 
hospitals is on the horizon 
(implications for surveillance remain 
to be seen). 
Viral sovereignty  
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 Cambodia Indonesia 
(3) 
Cultural 
Technical knowledge may come 
from neighboring countries that have 
had historical tensions with 
Cambodians. 
Vaccines to be produced by non-Western states 
like the Islamic Republic of  Iran (news 
announced 18 January 2009). 
Source: Adapted from Ear, Sophal (2009) “Towards Effective Emerging Infectious Diseases 
Surveillance: The Cases of Cambodia and Indonesia and the Experience of NAMRU-2,” Statement 
of Work, 11 February, p. 4. 
 
4. Results37 
 
This section first presents the key issues that emerged from the nearly 50 interviewees and considers 
these issues in light of the hypothesized political, economic, and cultural challenges from Table 3 to 
effective surveillance. It proceeds with an analysis of these challenges by interpreting similarities and 
differences in the context of each country’s level of development and dependence on foreign aid—a 
proxy for sovereignty since the less aid a country receives the less it relies on others. It concludes by 
arguing that while technical problems can be fixed with technical solutions (NAMRU-2 being a case 
in point), in the presence of political, economic, and cultural barriers, even the most advanced 
laboratory is no match. Consequently, while EID surveillance systems that are not nationally owned 
may possess short to medium-term viability (a decade, if that), these systems are not perpetually 
sustainable even with external funding, or may never reach a fully functional level in accordance with 
donor expectations. Although money may trump sovereignty in the short run, sovereignty trumps 
money in the long run. 
 
Analysis of Interview Results and Response on Hypothesized Variables 
Extensive interviews conducted by the author with public health officials across government, non-
governmental, and donor agencies in Cambodia and Indonesia (Table 4) reveal that the countries 
exhibit both similarities and differences in the perceived barriers to effective surveillance for EIDs.  
 
Table 4: Interviews Conducted 
 Cambodia Indonesia Total 
Interviews 14 26 40 
Unique Interview Subjects* 12 37 49 
                                                 
37 This analysis would not have been possible without the heroic efforts of my Research Assistant Zachariah James 
Falconer-Stout. 
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Note: * The number of interviews and unique interview subjects differs because while most 
interviews were one-on-one, some interviews were conducted with two or more persons, and yet 
others might have involved the same individual interviewed over the course of multiple visits. 
Source: Tabulation of author’s interview notes. 
 
For each country, interview subjects identified several economic, political, and cultural 
issues. Table 5 lists the most commonly identified factors that subjects emphasized as the top 
barriers in the order of their importance (based on frequency with which particular subjects were 
emphasized for a given country).  
 
Table 5: Key Issues Identified by Interview Subjects by Country 
Cambodia  Indonesia   
Issue Respondents referring 
to issue (percent)* 
Issue Respondents referring 
to issue (percent)† 
Low salaries 5 of 12 (42%) Poor host-donor 
relationship 
13 of 26 (50%) 
Donor dependence 
culture 
5 of 12 (42%) Differing host and donor 
priorities 
8 of 26 (31%) 
Poor staff 
management/HR 
4 of 12 (33%) Low salaries 7 of 26 (27%) 
Patronage networks 4 of 12 (33%) Decline in Min. of 
Health quality 
6 of 26 (23%) 
No compensation for 
culling 
4 of 12 (33%) NAMRU-2 is 
misunderstood 
6 of 26 (23%) 
Differing host and donor 
priorities 
3 of 12 (25%) Poor compensation for 
culling 
4 of 26 (15%) 
  Local levels don’t see 
reporting translated into 
response 
4 of 26 (15%) 
Note: Content analysis was performed on interview notes and tagged for key themes; these tags 
were then analyzed for frequency. 
* By proportion of interview sessions 
† By proportion of interview sessions 
Difference in calculation due to prevalence of group interviews in Indonesia 
Source: Tag analysis of author’s interview notes. 
 
In both countries, interviewees noted problems of corruption, patronage, low salaries, 
inadequate or non-existent compensation schemes for animal culling, and the potential for conflict 
between international donors and host governments. Differences emerge, however, in the extent of 
many of these issues. In Cambodia, the lack of resources received greater attention as the primary 
barrier to effective surveillance, while in Indonesia, conflict between external and host actors was 
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given greater emphasis. In both countries, interview subjects perceived animal disease surveillance to 
lag significantly behind human disease surveillance. 
 
Cambodia-Specific Findings 
For Cambodia, the key factors that emerged from interviews were low salaries, poor management of 
staff and human resources and the effect of patronage networks, a culture of donor dependency, 
contrasting priorities between the national government and international donors, and the lack of 
compensation for animal culling. Furthermore, the military’s influence on the Cambodian 
government plays a significant role. Yet some hypothesized variables did not prove to be key factors 
at this point.  
 
Low Salaries 
The low level of salary compensation (circa $50 per month, far less than the cost of living in Phnom 
Penh) was the most often pinpointed culprit in a larger context of poor human resources, which 
concurs with the hypothesis that a lack of resources would be a key barrier. In particular, this issue 
draws attention to the fact that of the myriad resources necessary for effective surveillance, human 
resources are most lacking in Cambodia (and in developing countries in general).38 Subjects 
mentioning this issue as a barrier frequently made reference to the fact that technical capacity far 
exceeded human capacity, and that the latter’s dearth was in fact preventing the efficient use of 
donor-funded equipment. As one international doctor bluntly stated, “In Cambodia, like anywhere 
in the world, if you pay people they do their job. If you don’t pay them they won’t. They’ve got to 
feed their kids.”39 All informants who discussed low compensation of civil servants—including those 
working in government labs—proceeded to explain that donors’ inability to tackle this problem was 
why donor-funded laboratory and/or EID surveillance equipment and supplies were under-utilized, 
unused, or even pilfered (as in the case of valuable reagents by the lab’s director).  
 
Poor Staff/Human Resources Management and the Effect of Patronage Networks 
                                                 
38 This problem eclipses even the usual theft of reagents from public labs for use in private labs (owned by staff and 
management in public labs), which hobbles public health surveillance efforts. 
39 Interview, Phnom Penh, 8 August 2009. 
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Poor management and the detrimental effects of patronage networks40 on the workplace are further 
manifestations of the prevalence of human resource utilization problems. Patronage networks, in 
particular, have a paralyzing effect on the work environment, often preventing managers from 
disciplining or taking corrective measures with staff out of a fear that the employees might have 
political or family connections above their own pay grade, or that the managers themselves are 
behind the racket. (Consider the above-cited real instance of a director helping himself to foreign-
donated reagents for his private laboratory.) 
 
Donor Dependence 
In Cambodia, there are specific problems associated with donor dependence, including a range of 
issues concerned with long-term planning. One is the lack of sustainability represented by the 
donor-driven model. In such a context, priorities can shift on a yearly basis, leading local workers to 
question the long-term commitment to a specific program. Such ambiguity is obviously detrimental 
to any program, as it diminishes the incentives of local staff to dive enthusiastically into a project 
when they might see funding cut before results can be shown.  
 
Contrasting Priorities 
Lack of ownership more generally is a serious problem in development work—how can external 
interventions be locally owned? Informants noted additional issues arising when the government 
avoids funds that come with too many strings attached, such as overly stringent auditing (Ministry of 
Health official)41 and the lack of a government grand plan to coordinate the various donor-driven 
programs (Ministry of Health senior official).42 In the latter situation, the Cambodian government is 
perceived as being unable to turn down funds, even when the funds are not helpful (International 
doctor).43 The respondent went on to elaborate that the worst sin is to jeopardize donor funds and 
keep them from flowing. The creation of a holistic program focused on training, equipment, and 
                                                 
40 Definition of patronage: “…an unequal relationship of mutual dependence and reciprocity. …depends on 
differentiation of power, wealth and status in society. …creates the position of Patron (who dispenses largesse, resources 
and protection) and Client (who provides loyalty and support to the patron). …is a voluntary and instrumental 
relationship. 2. A patron usually has several clients. Depending on their proximity to the Patron, clients may also have 
their own clients. The result is an informal hierarchy taking the shape of a pyramid with the Patron or ‘Big Man’ at the 
apex. Patrons may enter into mutually beneficial alliances. The patronage network refers to patronage ‘pyramids’ and 
patron alliances operating in a particular area/ community.” (http://www.icgg.org/downloads/2010/Cherotich.pdf 
Accessed 8 October 2011.)  
41 Interview, Phnom Penh 8 August 2009. 
42 Interview, Phnom Penh 8 August 2009. 
43 Interview, Phnom Penh 8 August 2009. 
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Concept of Operations,44 while necessary, is not sufficient. Laboratory personnel still need to be 
paid a commensurate level to their skills. (A government lab technician is still only paid $50 per 
month, while at the Pasteur Institute and at NAMRU-2, the compensation would be hundreds of 
dollars, if not more than $1,000, per month.) 
 
Lack of Compensation for Animal Culling 
Finally, interviewees emphasized the Cambodian government’s policy of not compensating for the 
culling necessary after animal outbreaks. While donors, including the World Bank and the United 
Nations, expressed a desire to help fund a compensation scheme, Cambodian authorities refused. 
The specific circumstances surrounding this decision, which came from the highest echelons of the 
government, remain shrouded in secrecy. There has been speculation, however, that the government 
deemed the possibility of corruption in poultry holders—whereby they might be compensated after 
willfully infecting their flocks even partially, so as to avoid a collapsed poultry market in which their 
birds would remain unsold—to be too large a potential liability and too dangerous to risk 
establishing a precedent of compensating citizens for government actions. This issue in particular is 
indicative of the manner in which resources can be politicized.  
 
The Budget and the Military: Behind the Key Issues 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Cambodian budget includes significant military 
expenditures—at least the equivalent of one-seventh of the foreign aid Cambodia received in 2007 
based on budget figures. In addition, the surprising end of a donor-funded incentive pay scheme, 
which included laboratory health employees funded by the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, was driven in part by complaints from the Cambodian military, who wanted similar pay 
incentives, but for whom there were no donor resources. A sub-decree signed by Prime Minister 
Hun Sen in 2005 set salary supplements of up to $400 per month for a civil servant with the rank of 
director-general and $50 for the rank of secretary.45 By January 2010, the Prime Minister had decided 
to stop salary supplements. And, while imperfect, the supplements were still a largely positive force 
                                                 
44 A document describing the characteristics of a proposed system from the viewpoint of an individual who will use that 
system; it is used to communicate the quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to all stakeholders. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concept_of_operations Accessed 8 October 2011.)  
45 Wallace, Julia and Phorn Bopha (2010). “Tension Over End of Civil Service Bonus Scheme.” The Cambodia Daily, 
Volume 44 Issue 51, 15 January. 
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in the lives of the country’s government workers and the last vestige of what had been a merit-based 
pay (the term has to be used loosely in the Cambodian context).46  
 
Potential Challenges Still Unproved 
Finally, some hypothesized variables (Cultural, Table 3) did not emerge as challenges—at least not 
yet. Hospital privatization in Cambodia, while controversial, has yet to begin, and thus its influence 
on the effectiveness of EID surveillance is undetermined. (However, in Indonesia, Cambodia, and 
Mexico, where the next phase of my research took me, private health-care providers appear 
disconnected from public health surveillance systems.) Private practice and hospital privatization are 
not one and the same. As one informant emphasized, the effect on surveillance will depend heavily 
on the privatization method chosen, and particularly on whether privatized hospitals continue to 
receive government and/or donor funding for treating poor patients, according to an international 
doctor.47  
Additionally, while cultural issues involving supervisors from Thailand working in Cambodia 
and ethnic Chinese versus Javanese in Indonesia were raised in several interviews, their overall 
impact is unclear. Certainly, historical tensions with Thailand and Vietnam have given rise to 
difficulties, particularly when Thai or Vietnamese nationals are placed in charge of Cambodians, but 
it is difficult to ascertain how exactly this issue affects EID surveillance. 
 
Indonesia-Specific Findings  
In Indonesia, the key issues emerging as barriers to effective surveillance include poor host-donor 
relationships and differing host-donor priorities, as well as a misunderstanding of NAMRU-2 by 
Indonesian authorities; low salaries; a decline in the quality of personnel in the Ministry of Health; 
poor compensation for culling; and difficulty incentivizing local levels to report back to the central 
government in an era of decentralization following democratization.  
 
Poor Host-Donor Relationships 
In contrast to Cambodia, the top two issues arising out of Indonesia both focused on the 
relationship between the host country—Indonesia—and its donors. The issue occurred again in the 
                                                 
46 Ibid. I am quoted at the end of the story as saying the following about salary supplements: “Were they perfect? No. 
Did they incentivize? Yes. Did they make a life-or-death difference in someone’s livelihood? Probably not. Will things 
work better as a result of their elimination? Probably not.” 
47 Interview, Phnom Penh 8 August 2009. 
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fifth-most emphasized factor: a disconnect or miscommunication between NAMRU-2 and 
Indonesian authorities regarding NAMRU-2’s activities and contributions to disease surveillance. It 
should be noted that interviews were conducted during NAMRU-2 Jakarta’s last days—staff were 
still coming to work, hoping closure could be averted—and thus subjects may to some extent have 
been responding to the news of that time. As often happens with departing diplomats and those 
about to leave their jobs, this made for extremely candid conversations. With NAMRU-2 Jakarta 
officially “closed” since April 2010, and its Commanding Officer now based in Hawaii, any hope of 
a resolution has withered. 
Yet, independent of the NAMRU-2 affair, problems in host-donor relations are an 
understandable barrier in Indonesia, a country that exhibits significantly greater autonomy than 
Cambodia and other developing countries in the international realm and vis-à-vis donors. Unlike in 
Cambodia, the Indonesian government is operating surveillance systems out of its own interests 
resulting from its sense of greater accountability to its citizens. Consequently, the government has 
been better at articulating its own needs—partly because it does enjoy greater human resources 
capacity than Cambodia, but primarily because of a greater ownership of its own affairs and a higher 
expectation that donors will meet these needs. 
 
Low Salaries 
The low salaries issue is similar to that in Cambodia, and indicative of a lack of adequate resources 
that is particularly acute on the human capacity side. It should be noted, however, that unlike 
Cambodia there was no perception of “ghost labs”—labs that are equipped but are empty of local 
personnel because they moonlight elsewhere. Concurring with the preliminary hypotheses, the lack 
of resources was emphasized to a much lesser extent in Indonesia than in Cambodia. 
Despite its greater resources, Indonesia still suffers from a lack of sustainability in its 
surveillance efforts and public health laboratory capacity. The fact that the Indonesian government 
contributes significantly more of its own money to public health activities than Cambodia—because 
it can afford to do so—does not preclude concerns of sustainability, a fact that some donors only 
later recognized when activities they funded were handed over to the Indonesian authorities. For 
example, Indonesian authorities took control of NAMRU-2’s Early Warning Outbreak Response 
System (EWORS) but could not continue efforts due to a lack of financial resources. When 
Indonesian authorities requested NAMRU-2 also hand over the millions of dollars needed to run 
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EWORS, NAMRU-2 refused as these were U.S. government funds that could not simply be given 
to Indonesian authorities to spend. EWORS is reportedly not functioning.48  
 
Decline in Ministry of Health Personnel Quality 
As discussed, viral sovereignty emerged as a key issue as a result of the Indonesian government’s 
impression that it was being asked to pay millions of dollars for a vaccine that was developed using a 
sample that the government had originally provided for diagnostic purposes. Ultimately, as the 
interview material reveals, the root of the problem was not this incident itself—although it might 
have been the a catalyst—but a breakdown in communication between a specific donor (NAMRU-
2) and the host government that had begun much earlier.49  
Significant here was a perceived decline in qualified personnel at the Ministry of Health, 
though criticism focused on the specific personality of the former Minister of Health Siti Fadilah 
Supari, and was connected to the fallout over NAMRU-2. Concurrently, the composition of 
NAMRU-2’s American staff changed from highly experienced, seasoned hands who had already 
established themselves as authorities to younger researchers who needed to “publish or perish,” 
according to an interview with an international scientist.50 What had been a mutually beneficial 
relationship based on capacity-building turned into one of research execution for the purpose of 
publishing in order to burnish a young researcher’s credentials. Unlike the younger scientists now 
populating NAMRU-2, the more established scientists decades earlier were not driven by such 
concerns.51 An epidemiologist in Thailand’s Ministry of Health, who reported similar issues with 
American government lab in Thailand, supported this sentiment.52 The effect is that refereed 
research became paramount and capacity-building became an afterthought. 
The cultural hypothesis involving Indonesia’s desire to partner with a state such as Iran, also 
a Muslim country, was unsupported. There was the 2008 announcement of a possible partnership 
with Iran to manufacture vaccines, but this was more rhetoric than reality, with evidence confirmed 
in conversations during my visit. The Minister of Health attempted to garner support by announcing 
in March 2009 that she wanted to stop vaccinating children against meningitis, mumps, and other 
                                                 
48 Interview, Jakarta 4 January 2010. A pilot system, called EWARS (Early Warning and Reporting System), with limited 
support by WHO and U.S.-CDC, should not be confused with EWORS. 
49 Interview, Jakarta 7 January 2010. 
50 Interview, Jakarta 7 January 2010. 
51 It could also be that the drive for and incentive to publish (built into evaluations of personnel working for labs like 
NAMRU-2) have changed over time. Three decades ago the pressure might not have been as severe as today. 
52 Interview, Beijing 15 July 2010. 
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childhood diseases with Western-made vaccines, in order to prevent global pharmaceutical 
companies from exploiting Indonesians as, it was claimed, they had exploited Africans by controlling 
cures.53  
What is certainly true is that the arrival of the new Minister of Health, Endang Rahayu 
Sedyaningsih—who holds a master’s and doctorate from the Harvard University School of Public 
Health and was an advisor in the Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response 
at the WHO54 (the former minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, was a clinician practicing cardiology)—has 
renewed confidence in the rational-legal basis of policy-making in the Ministry. Yet whether the 
Indonesia-U.S. Center for Biomedical Research, announced in 2009 to replace NAMRU-2, will 
materialize (not as of this writing) may not depend solely on the decisions of the Indonesian 
Minister. The joint center, if realized, will require U.S. and Indonesian funding. One idea had been 
to reallocate the U.S. Navy’s original funding to NAMRU-2 to the joint center, but then U.S. Navy 
personnel would necessarily be involved in the center.  
 
Poor Culling Compensation 
Similar to Cambodia, the absence of compensation for culling also emerged as a key issue in 
Indonesia. Indonesia’s regime has allowed for some compensation. In 2006, Indonesia budgeted Rp 
33 billion ($3.69 million as of 10 February, 2011 exchange rate) for compensation, and in 2007 it 
budgeted Rp 15 billion plus up to Rp 100 billion from an emergency budget, if needed. Prior to 
2007, there was no donor funding for compensation, until the World Bank provided $5 million in 
grant-based funding on 7 March, 2006 (creating the National Committee for Avian Influenza 
Control and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, known as Komnas FBPI). However, no actual 
compensation is said to have been issued due to disbursement problems.  
Komnas FBPI, created by executive order and staffed by young people—some of whom 
were known to be contractors—may have been too small and too new to execute such a complex 
operation. Its head was a dynamic Vice Minister for the Coordination of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Maritime Affairs, who was also Chairman of the National Coordination Team for 
Food Stability and Vice Chairman of the Program of Action for the Use of Alternative Energy. 
                                                 
53 See Ricks, Delthia (2010) “The Intellectual Property Fight That Could Kill Millions”, Discover Magazine (Online 
Edition), 28 January. Available: http://discovermagazine.com/2009/dec/28-intellectual-property-fight-that-could-kill-
millions/article_view?b_start:int=2&-C= Accessed 8 October 2011. 
54 Simamora, Adianto (2009) “Let me prove it all in my work: Endang”, The Jakarta Post, 29 October. Available: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/29/let-me-prove-it-all-my-work-endang.html Accessed 8 October 
2011. 
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Holding so many responsibilities in addition to Komnas FBPI likely made the job difficult. Komnas 
FBPI ended its mandate on 13 March 2010 as scheduled in the Presidential decree that established it 
in 2006. In its short existence, among other activities, it created public service announcements on 
television and radio and distributed 100,000 Avian Influenza kits containing masks, gloves, a street 
banner, two bird-flu Video CDs, liquid soap, bar soap, stickers, flyers, and a booklet on H5N1 to 
high-risk hamlets. 
 
Difficulties in Incentivizing Local-Level Reporting 
Finally, during four group interviews in Indonesia, the country’s recent experience with 
decentralization emerged as having a significant impact on surveillance. In particular, what had been 
very strong top-down central government control has ceded way in recent years to local autonomy. 
Ultimately, however, disease surveillance data need to be collected and centralized in order to 
discover potential outbreaks. The breakdown was identified as disincentives at the local level: while 
local health workers are responsible for reporting, they often fail to see reported cases addressed by 
the central government because there is no feedback loop. On the local level, the primary concern is 
diagnosing and treating illness; reporting does not necessarily aid in accomplishing this task. 
Furthermore, when samples are sent to Jakarta, the long delays compound the perception that the 
central level is unhelpful in meeting district and provincial priorities. The divergence of priorities has 
both sides feeling that they have critical needs left unfulfilled by the disease surveillance regime, 
impeding its efficacy. 
 
5. Overall Findings 
 
It is critical to note that while this research is concerned with political, economic, and cultural 
barriers to disease surveillance (as opposed to technical or scientific barriers), the questions asked 
were open to all kinds of barriers. It was often the interview subjects themselves, therefore, who 
referred to “social science” variables. Their responses indicate that at present, the greatest barriers to 
effective surveillance systems may be shortcomings on the human side, although additional 
interviews of government officials and NGOs with in-country experience is needed to confirm this 
preliminary finding.  
Consequently, and in contrast to the priorities of many donors, what is needed is not greater 
investment in hardware by building host nations a $200 million lab instead of a $3 million lab—a 
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typically technical (and expensive) solution—but a willingness for donors to play a greater role in incentivizing 
productive work environments. This need must be balanced with the risks that salary supplements, which 
incentivize work, will cause disparity and wage distortions and are themselves not sustainable in the 
long run. In Cambodia, two subjects (a Ministry of Health senior official and an international 
scientist)55 emphasized the presence of state-of-the-art “ghost labs,” where donor-funded 
infrastructure goes unused due to inadequate human resources. 
The similar issues that interview subjects identified as impeding surveillance systems in 
Cambodia and Indonesia stem from these states’ status as developing countries. It is not surprising 
that a lack of financial resources, the absence of a professional civil service, and the existence of 
patronage networks and corruption constitute challenges in this context. It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that other developing countries, then, face similar barriers along a continuum from one 
extreme (Cambodia, where a genocide resulted in the death of a quarter of the population, 
particularly intellectuals) to another (Indonesia, where expensive labs can be run by Indonesians 
educated in France and Australia, with some donor support). In both countries, the lack of local 
resources has necessitated heavy donor involvement in order to achieve the present surveillance 
systems. 
As interviews revealed, however, donor involvement in each country has met a different 
response. While interview subjects noted the potential for friction in both countries, it was 
particularly pronounced in Indonesia, where it has been attributed as a key factor leading to the 
closure of NAMRU-2. Beyond the poor relationship between the host government and international 
actors (including non-American ones, such as the sometimes tenuous relationship of ex-colonies and 
their former colonizers), other challenges specific to Indonesia include a perceived decline in the 
qualifications of Ministry of Health personnel, and difficulty in incentivizing local reporting by 
responding in a timely manner at the central level. For Cambodia, there is a perception that the 
challenges posed by corruption, patronage, and the lack of human resources are more acute. 
Additional issues also arise due to poor management and a culture associated with donor 
dependence.  
Ultimately, these differences are symptomatic of Cambodia’s and Indonesia’s different levels 
of development and their roles within regional and international communities. Cambodia is 
significantly less developed and appears locked in a cycle of “donor dependence” in which a 
significant burden of governing tasks is assumed by international donors (NGOs, bilateral, and 
                                                 
55 Interviews, Phnom Penh 8 August 2009. 
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multilateral agencies). Indonesia, on the other hand, has developed a relatively higher level of 
governing capacity, or sovereignty. While donors remain significantly involved in key functions, the 
Indonesian government ultimately assumes responsibility, and funds a greater proportion of its 
operations through its own tax base. (Cambodia’s tax revenues are 8% of GDP, while foreign aid is 
above 10% of GPD; Indonesia’s tax revenues are 11%, while its foreign aid is 1.1% of GDP.) 
Furthermore, while Cambodia is a small country of approximately 14 million, Indonesia spans 
17,508 islands populated by approximately 228 million people—a point Indonesian interviewees 
seldom fail to stress—making it the world’s fourth-most populous country and reasonably placing it 
in the category of “regional power.” 
This context is central to understanding the interviews conducted: it demonstrates that 
donor dependence is the primary difference in barriers to surveillance between the countries. In 
Cambodia, donor dependence has resulted in an environment where the primary objective is to 
obtain funds from donors. As a result, the host government is generally compliant with donor 
priorities; the relationship between the host and donor is cordial, and the host will go to great 
lengths to please its benefactor, often acting like a supplicant. The downside of this environment, 
however, is lack of ownership and poor governance: endemic corruption and oppressive patronage 
networks impede meritocratic work environments, with an expected detrimental impact on 
surveillance. This overriding problem can explain why, despite significant technical investment, 
disease surveillance systems fall short of donors’ standards: the human side of the equation remains 
underdeveloped. 
Indonesia’s greater independence and more competent governance, on the other hand, has 
the benefit of alleviating—though certainly not eliminating—the problems of corruption, patronage, 
and ineffective civil service. These same attributes, however, carry a certain trade-off for donors, as 
the host government is understandably more aware of its own local needs and is better able to 
articulate these needs. The accompanying expectation is that organizations hosted by the national 
government will assist in meeting these national priorities.56 In the context of a more developed 
governing capacity, the national host may be more susceptible to domestic political pressures arising 
from a foreign presence. In contrast to an aid-dependent nation, donors’ money and presence is not 
an unambiguous good. As a result, in Indonesia, the overriding challenge facing donors is 
                                                 
56 For example, if NAMRU-2 scientists are evaluated on the basis of research produced, and this priority conflicts with 
meeting host nation needs, then reconciling these priorities might be a step towards improving relations. Alternatively, 
more senior (retired) scientists—if willing to serve as some apparently were decades earlier—could also be tapped. 
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maintaining a good working relationship with the host government. A real or perceived divergence 
in the interests of the host and foreign donor organization risks the foreign organization “wearing 
out its welcome.”57 In this environment, a foreign organization must give greater thought to 
effective public relations, not to mention political and cultural considerations, as the risks of being 
misunderstood can be catastrophic and have the potential to lead to derailments like that of 
NAMRU-2. 
Of particular relevance to this study was the agreement in both Cambodia and Indonesia 
that animal disease surveillance systems lag behind human disease surveillance. The finding was also 
reflected in the respondents’ views of the Ministries of Health versus the Ministries of Agriculture; 
the latter were ubiquitously viewed as less capable and less important. This factor fails to appear in 
Table 5 because, while commonly acknowledged, only a handful of respondents (two in Cambodia 
and three in Indonesia) emphasized this view as a primary barrier to effective disease surveillance. 
There was also some indication that a rivalry between ministries contributed to poor animal 
surveillance (two respondents in Cambodia and one in Indonesia noted this factor). Additionally, 
two respondents in Indonesia indicated a more general need for better coordination between the 
multiple agencies and organizations involved in the effort. 
A study by the World Health Organization’s Angela Merianos (2007), of the Department of 
Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response, argued that on “a global level, the human health sector 
lags behind the animal health sector in the assessment of potential threats,” because “little attention 
has been given to determining the direct and indirect costs of human disease outbreaks, including 
morbidity and excess mortality, health service delivery costs, public health expenditure, the 
psychosocial impact on affected individuals, families and communities, the economic impact on 
travel, tourism and the insurance industry, and loss of confidence in governments and health 
services.”58 Merianos allowed that “substantive differences exist among countries in their national 
                                                 
57 Even during the 2004 tsunami that affected Aceh, Indonesia, and many other countries, there was great sensitivity to 
having American military personnel on the ground in the humanitarian mission that followed. In Cambodia, examples 
abound. The most recent cancellation by the Cambodian authorities of a $28.8 million Land Management and 
Administration Project by the World Bank because of “too many conditions,” according to Cambodia’s Prime Minister 
(as quoted in O’Toole, James and Khouth Sophak Chakrya (2011). “World Bank Blunder,” Phnom Penh Post, 9 March, 
2011). 
58 Merianos, Angela (2007) “Surveillance and Response to Disease Emergence” in James E. Childs, John S. Mackenzie 
and Jürgen A. Richt eds. Wildlife and Emerging Zoonotic Diseases: The Biology, Circumstances and Consequences of Cross-Species 
Transmission, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. 
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preparedness planning for emerging diseases,”59 and both Cambodia and Indonesia have shown this 
to be the case.  
Further research is necessary to determine if there is a developed vs. developing world divide 
that explains human health lagging behind animal health in assessing potential threats or if some 
other factor is at work, or if Merianos has been misinterpreted. If the hypothesis that human health 
lagging animal health is correct,60 it will be of interest to determine what has led Cambodia and 
Indonesia to buck the global trend. The market may explain this; unlike Mexico, neither country 
officially exports livestock in significant quantities to richer countries—the U.S. in Mexico’s case—
which means that animal health threats need not be vigilantly evaluated as a bottom line issue for 
export compliance (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures). Absent such investigation, however, the 
most plausible explanation for discrepancies between animal and human disease surveillance may be 
that the life of a human is valued more than that of an animal, and in poor countries struggling to 
find the resources to deal with human beings, the monitoring of animals will suffer from chronic 
neglect. In the case of Indonesia, the one cultural factor that emerged was ethnic Chinese poultry 
producers versus the ethnically Javanese-dominated civil servants who regulate them.61 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Scientists are fully capable of fixing technical problems in disease surveillance systems, but non-
technical barriers have been more difficult to confront. The primary challenges impeding 
surveillance are observed on the human resources side of the equation. Nevertheless, as experiences 
in both Cambodia and Indonesia demonstrate, the technical and human sides of disease surveillance 
systems are complementary inputs—and an awareness of economic, political, and cultural issues is 
critical if policy-makers are to strategically build more effective systems.  
                                                 
59 Merianos (2007). 
60 Early findings from the author’s follow-on study of Mexico’s experience with A/H1N1 confirmed Merianos’ finding 
there—animal disease surveillance, driven by trade concerns with the U.S.—appears in better shape than human disease 
surveillance. 
61 To provide some context, Indonesia enjoys industrial production of poultry, as opposed to the backyard production 
that takes place in Cambodia. The majority of Indonesian commercial poultry producers are said to be majority ethnic 
Chinese (Interview, Jakarta 4 January 2010). Precise numbers are not available, but it is known that while one percent of 
Indonesia is ethnic Chinese, the captains of industry come from this group, and they tend to be deeply distrusting of the 
Javanese-controlled government. Lack of consultation and lack of trust have meant that public-private cooperation 
suffers, and problems are not reported. Indeed, to avoid regulations and taxes, some “mom and pop” operations use 
wooden pens even if they hold one hundred thousand chickens. This enables them to be categorized as backyard 
operations. 
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On 11 April, 2010, a senior Indonesian scientist whom I interviewed in January 2010 sent 
me the following: “Namru-2 Jakarta is shutting down. I have been very sad. Not only because I am 
losing my job, but more than that, Indonesia will [lose] an established laboratory research [because] 
of political reasons.”62 The United States’ loss may not be Indonesia’s gain, for who knows where or 
for whom this scientist will work next. As recently as February 2010, the expected visit of President 
Obama in March 2010 (postponed from 2009 once already and again in March due to the passage of 
health care reform) seemed to offer hope, according to U.S.-Indonesia affairs expert Bara Hasibuan, 
the co-chairman of International Relations for the Indonesian National Mandate Party and a U.S.-
Indonesia affairs expert: “I think we should be able to get a new agreement on science and 
technology … beyond Namru. We should be able to groom our own scientists and achievements 
from the relations.”63 Yet diplomatic visas for American NAMRU-2 personnel were evidently not 
renewed,64 leading to the permanent closure of NAMRU-2 and lessened surveillance capacity in the 
short to medium term. 
Indeed, when it comes to viral sovereignty, the solution proposed by New York University 
School of  Law fellow Matthew Herder, who has been studying the impasse between Indonesia and 
the rest of  the world, sounds simple enough: “Developed countries should provide technology 
transfer to help poor countries, allowing them to produce their own vaccines.”65 In fact, only if  
technology transfer entails the development of  both human (a skilled and educated local labor force) 
and material capacity (equipment that will meet the demands of  the projects) can sustainability be 
envisaged. Hasibuan echoes the same argument more generally when speaking of  what would have 
been the March 2010 visit of  President Obama: “Of  course, we automatically hope there will be an 
increase in trade and investment relations. What we need is a transfer of  technology and scientific 
research that give us a boost. It’s one of  the most concrete benefits we can get.”66 That visit finally 
took place in November 2010, far too late to save NAMRU-2 or jumpstart the joint Center. 
                                                 
62 E-mail communication received by the author on 11 April, 2010 at 9:45pm. 
63 As quoted in The Jakarta Post (2010) “Obama Visit ‘Opens Door for RI,’” The Jakarta Post, 8 February. Available: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/02/08/obama-visit-%E2%80%98opens-doors-ri%E2%80%99.html 
Accessed 8 October 2011. 
64 “Namru was closed down after Jakarta and Washington failed to agree on its operational procedure, including on 
diplomatic immunity sought by Washington for US staff working at the lab.” Budianto, Lilian (2010) “RI aims at 
resolution of military ban in US partnership: Ministry,” The Jakarta Post, 5 March. Available: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/05/ri-aims-resolution-military-ban-us-partnership-ministry.html 
Accessed 8 October 2011. 
65 As cited in Ricks (2010). 
66 As quoted in The Jakarta Post (2010). 
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Yet this is more easily said than done.67 International development—that is, the business of  
transferring both technology and human capacity—has tried for more than 60 years to achieve this 
result with limited success (Taiwan and South Korea enjoyed high levels of  foreign aid and 
succeeded in developing). What is certain is that Indonesia’s human resources are already capable of  
producing some vaccines given sufficient technology (PT Bio Farma, a state-owned company based 
in Bandung, produces influenza vaccine),68 while Cambodia will require a decade or more to produce 
vaccines in-country—with the issue of  viral sovereignty not yet on the horizon.69 
Many of the key factors emerging from interviews are symptomatic of current levels of 
development, and as such are perhaps beyond the scope of health agencies. Nevertheless, greater 
understanding is a critical first step in mitigating negative outcomes. Overall, it is obvious that 
scientists and international agencies wishing to build more effective disease surveillance systems 
must recognize the non-technical constraints that each country presents. 
                                                 
67 The Indonesia-United States Center for Biomedical and Public Health Research first announced in September, 2009 in 
a joint statement between U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius and then 
Indonesian Minister of Health Siti Fadilah Supari has yet to materialize. 
68 For example, one advanced laboratory in Indonesia is in such dire need of money that its scientists (interviewed in 
Jakarta on 12 January 2010) work on a month-to-month basis. 
69 A Ministry of Health official in Cambodia knew about viral sovereignty and even characterized the issue as one of 
benefit-sharing, but unless Cambodians become involved in testing (as happened in the case of AIDS anti-retrovirals for 
prophylaxis use, when the Cambodian Prime Minister stopped trials), viral sovereignty does not appear to be of 
immediate concern in Cambodia. 
